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ADJUDICATED ON THE MERITS?: WHY
THE AEDPA REQUIRES STATE COURTS TO
EXHIBIT THEIR REASONING
EZRA SPILKE*

INTRODUCTION

According to Felix Frankfurter, "[it] is a fair summary of
history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been
forged in controversies involving not very nice people." 1 But,
Frankfurter admonishes, the Court must, nevertheless, deal fairly
with bad people by adhering to the law.'
Similarly, although most petitioners seeking a writ of habeas
corpus have committed a crime at least as objectionable as the one
for which they were convicted,3 "the Constitution sometimes
insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the [liberty] of
us all."4 And so, for many years the federal writ of habeas corpus
remained a vital last resort for persons in state custody whose
liberty was unlawfully restrained by the states! Particularly,
. J.D., The John Marshall Law School, 2006. The author wishes to
thank his family and friends, especially George, Sam, Chad, Irene, Brock and
Justin, for their unalloyed support. This article is dedicated to the memory of
Karen Hunter.
1. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950)(Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
2. See id. ("[Wihile we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we
must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes
expressed by the Fourth Amendment.").
3. Please note the distinction between habeas corpus petitioners and
criminal defendants or suspects. Criminal defendants are innocent until
proven guilty and their guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 64 (1970)(holding that the due process clause
entitles a criminal defendant to a determination only upon proof of the facts
underlying the crime that he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt). Habeas
petitioners, however, seek post-conviction relief. That is, they have already
been convicted of and sentenced for committing a particular crime. Therefore,
it would be exceptionally cynical of the criminal justice system to presume
more than half of convicted criminals are not guilty.
4. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987).
5. See Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1868)("The great writ of
habeas corpus has been for centuries esteemed the best and only sufficient
defence of personal freedom."); Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939) ("It
must never be forgotten that the writ of habeas corpus is the precious
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federal courts have used habeas corpus to vindicate the protections
of liberty guaranteed by constitutionally-mandated criminal
procedure when they have been threatened by state courts.6
However, the passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") has insulated state courts
from federal scrutiny of many of their omissions of duty relating to
individual rights. Specifically, the AEDPA limits reversals of state
court convictions to situations in which the decision is "contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of... Federal law."7 As
the Supreme Court has indicated, the standard of review under
the AEDPA is highly deferential to state courts.' Significantly,
however, a federal court does not owe any AEDPA deference to a
state court conviction and may review the claim de novo unless the
petitioner's claim was "adjudicated on the merits"9 in the state
court."0 Thus, when federal courts consider whether to apply the
AEDPA standard of review or pre-AEDPA de novo review, they
focus much of their attention on whether the habeas petitioner's
criminal procedure claim has been adjudicated on the merits."

safeguard of personal liberty and there is no higher duty than to maintain it
unimpaired."); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 105 (1942) (noting that the
writ of habeas corpus is the final "means of preserving" a state prisoner's
constitutional rights).
6. See, e.g., Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) ("I think the writ ought always to lie for claims of nonobservance
of those procedures that, as so aptly described by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Palko
v. Connecticut, are 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'")(citation
omitted).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000).
8. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-10 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,
Concurring)(disagreeing with Justice Steven's construction of AEDPA, which
leaves the level of deference unchanged, and holding that "contrary to" means
"opposite," and not plainly different, and that unreasonableness must be
evaluated objectively); see also Robert D. Sloane, AEDPA's "Adjudication on
the Merits" Requirement: Collateral Review, Federalism, and Comity, 78 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 615, 617-18 (2004) (arguing that the AEDPA standard is
difficult to apply because it requires both fact-sensitive and politicallysensitive judgment).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
10. See, e.g., Gipson v. Jordan, 376 F.3d 1193, 1196 (10th Cir. 2004)
(holding that if a state court did not decide a claim on the merits the issue is
reviewed de novo).
11. Compare DiBenedetto v. Hall, 272 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that
a federal constitutional claim is not adjudicated on the merits if the state court
did not in any way decide it even by reference to state court decisions dealing
with that issue) with Gipson, 376 F.3d at 1196 (implying that the presumption
with summary dismissals of federal claims is that the state court did reach the
merits of the claim). See generally Sloane, supra note 8, at 618-19, 636-644
(discussing the numerous "permutations" of tests advanced by the federal
circuits to determine if there was an "adjudication on the merits" when the
state appellate court summarily dismisses the federal claim).
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Discerning whether a claim has been adjudicated on the
merits can be a controversial issue.
Because of overloaded
dockets, sandbagging defendants, or ignorance of criminal
procedure, state court judges will, sometimes, summarily dismiss
a criminal defendant's claim of procedural violation. 12 Without
clearly defined reasoning, it is impossible to discern whether a
state court's decision was arrived at through sound deliberation or
on a whim. However, in most federal judicial circuits, such
unreasoned dismissals of procedural claims are considered
adjudications
on the merits and are, therefore, subject to little
13
scrutiny.
This comment focuses on what adjudication means and
suggests that subjecting unreasoned opinions to AEDPA deference
is contrary to both the intent of the act and to the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the act.
Part I discusses the historical
importance of habeas corpus from the nineteenth century to today.
Part II addresses the problems with current habeas corpus
jurisprudence and examines how it diverges from historical and
legislative expectations. Part III proposes a new standard for
determining when a state court has adjudicated a claim on the
merits.

I.

DE NOVO TO 'UNREASONABLE' AND 'CONTRARY': THE
DEVELOPMENT OF HABEAS CORPUS JURISPRUDENCE

This section traces the development of the law of habeas
corpus. An overview of the history of federal habeas corpus will
demonstrate that the availability of relief afforded to those in state
custody is dependent on the relationship between federal and state
courts .14

A. From England to the Colonies
The English remedy of habeas corpus was originally a writ
used to summon defendants into court. 5 By the mid-fourteenth
12. Summary dismissals, as the term is used herein, dispatch a defendant's
claim without any stated reasoning. See, e.g., Clanton v. United States, 284
F.3d 420, 426-27 (2d Cir. 2002) (discussing the rationale behind requiring
specific findings of fact in support of summary dismissals). A summary
dismissal may or may not address the particular procedural violation. For
example, when a defendant seeks to exclude evidence because it was obtained
in violation of his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and
seizure, it makes no difference whether the judge or magistrate dismisses "the
defendant's Fourth Amendment claims" or "all of the defendant's claims."
13. See infra notes 84-92.
14. See 1 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2.4, at 27-36 (5th ed. 2001) (comparing federal
habeas corpus with United States Supreme Court certiorarireview).
15. WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 4,

12, 17 (Greenwood Press 1980).
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century, prisoners were petitioning courts for writs of habeas
corpus to "examine the cause of the imprisonment. " " By the
eighteenth century, Sir William Blackstone had called habeas
corpus "the most celebrated writ in the English law." 7
The American writ of habeas corpus was, in turn, modeled
after the English common law writ. 8 Although habeas corpus
relief was originally believed not to apply in the colonies through
English common law, 9 it was included in the first colonial
charter."' Thereafter, many of the colonies provided habeas corpus
relief by charter, statute, or common law.'
B. The Writ of Habeas Corpus in Early FederalLaw
The United States Constitution prohibits Congress from
suspending the writ of habeas corpus.'
In 1789, Congress
expressly granted federal courts the power to issue writs of habeas

16. Id. at 24-25. This early version of habeas corpus, known as habeas
corpus cum causa, was a combination of habeas corpus with another writ
which demanded of the sheriff the reason for the detention. Id. at 25. Thus, at
this early date, courts had connected the notions of summoning a defendant
from imprisonment and questioning the reason for his detention.
17. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES 128-29 (Thomas M. Cooley
ed., Chicago, Callaghan 3d ed. rev. 1884).
18. See Duker, supra note 15, at 6.
19. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 17, at 95-96 (describing the seventeenth
century theory whereby England's "indigenous" laws, i.e. common law, did not
apply in a colony when a Christian country conquers and colonizes the
kingdom of an infidel).
20. Id. at 98.
21. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 15.2, at 843-44 (3d ed.
1999).
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it."). It has been debated whether this provision
was intended to make habeas corpus a constitutional guarantee or simply to
acknowledge the writ as a statutory creation, enacted by Congress at its will.
Compare CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 844 ("[Tjhe Constitutional
Convention prevented Congress from obstructing the state courts' ability to
grant the writ, but did not try to create a federal constitutional right to habeas
corpus.") with Eric M. Freedman, The Suspension Clause in the Ratification
Debates, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 451, 455-65, 468 (1996) (surveying the history of
the debates over the ratification of the Constitution and concluding that the
states believed that the Suspension Clause was a constitutional guarantee). It
is also interesting to note that when the habeas corpus clause was submitted
to the Committee of Detail by South Carolina delegate Charles Pinckney, the
clause read, "The privileges and benefit of the Writ of Habeas corpus shall be
enjoyed in this Government in the most expeditious and ample manner; and
shall not be suspended... except upon the most urgent and pressing
occasions...." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 340-42,
438 (Max Farrand, ed., Yale Univ. Press 1966). The "expeditious and ample"
language had been dropped by the time the clause was voted on eight days
later. Id. at 435, 438.
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corpus.23 Originally this power extended only to federal prisoners,
but did not extend to state prisoners.4
After the Civil War, Congress amended the habeas corpus
act.25 As amended, the act extended the federal habeas corpus
power to reach free state prisoners.26 Accordingly, Congress was
motivated, at least in part, by its fear that, without federal
oversight, southern states would abuse criminal processes to
target freed slaves.2 7 Thus, the Act of February 5, 1867 provided
state prisoners with protection from unconstitutional detentions. 2
In the 130 years between the 1867 amendment and the
AEDPA, the development of the standard of review of state
decisions underwent a slow but radical change. At first, an
unconstitutional detention was found only when the detention was
imposed by a court that lacked jurisdiction.2 9 At the beginning of
the twentieth century, the United States Supreme Court was still
concerned with comity but was willing to broaden its concept of
unconstitutional detentions."0 However, even then it was clear
23. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82.
24. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 844. See Ex parte Dorr, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 103, 105 (1845) (holding that neither the Judiciary Act of 1789 nor
Article III of the Constitution grants power to a judge to issue a writ of habeas
corpus to summon a state prisoner for any reason other than to be used as a
witness).
25. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 224154).
26. See Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 325-26 (1867) (Chase,
C.J.) (holding that the 1867 act "brings within the habeas corpus jurisdiction
of every court and of every judge every possible case of privation of liberty
contrary to the National Constitution, treaties, or laws"); DUKER, supra note
15, at 189-90 (stating that according to the unambiguous words of the statute,
a state prisoner may petition for federal habeas corpus). The relevant
language of the statute reads:
[Tihe several courts of the United States, and the several justices and
judges of such courts, within their respective jurisdictions, in addition to
the authority already conferred by law, shall have power to grant writs
of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may he restrained of his
or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of
the United States.
14 Stat. at 385.
27. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 845 (noting that the drafters
designed the new habeas corpus provision to protect freed slaves from
unconstitutional confinement).
28. 14 Stat. at 385.
29. See, e.g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 371, 375 (1879)(holding
that the Court can only issue a writ of habeas corpus if the state court lacks
jurisdiction and that "[miere error in the judgment or proceedings...
constitutes no ground for the issue of the writ").
30. In two cases in particular, the Court, upon petitions to reverse
convictions stemming from mob-dominated trials, indicated that the power to
grant habeas corpus did not end with correcting procedural defects. In Frank
v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915), the prisoner brought a petition for habeas
corpus after having been sentenced to death for murder. Id. at 311-12. The
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that purely legal questions were to be determined de novo. 31
By the time of the Warren Court, federal courts had greater
powers of review over habeas petitions than they did on direct
review. 2 In 1966, Congress clarified the standard of review of
factual determinations required of federal courts on habeas
petitions. 3 The 1966 amendments were silent as to the standard
of review on legal decisions.' Thus, in light of the silence on the
matter of state courts' legal error, the standard of review for
decisions of law remained de novo.35

prisoner's trial lasted four weeks, during which time he had the assistance of
several attorneys. Id. at 312. Although the prisoner, a Jew, made a showing
of mob influence, the state supreme court, after an evidentiary hearing,
disagreed and affirmed the conviction. Id. at 312-14. Upon petition for habeas
corpus, the Court found that the trial was not mob-dominated. Id. at 335. The
Court did, however, go on to state that if the trial had been mob-dominated,
that would amount to a denial of due process which would enable the Court to
issue habeas corpus. Id. Eight years later, in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86
(1923), the Court was again faced with a mob-dominated trial. In Moore, a
group of black men were convicted for the murder of a white man and
sentenced to death. Id. at 90. After the prisoners' arrests, a mob marched to
the jail in order to lynch them and were stopped only when town officials
promised the mob that "law would be carried out." Id. at 88-89. According to
the post-trial affidavits of a few of the witnesses, a number of black witnesses,
two of whom were relied upon to establish the prisoners' guilt, were whipped
and beaten until they promised to testify as to the prisoners' guilt. Id. at 89.
The Court, while reaffirming "that the corrective process supplied by the State
may be so adequate that interference by Habeas corpus ought not to be
allowed," went on to hold that the courts of the United States must intervene
when the entire trial was tainted and the state court did nothing to remedy it.
Id. at 91-92. Thus, although the state courts may have jurisdiction, federal
courts have a duty to secure constitutional rights.
31. See 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 14, at 66 (reconciling the
disagreement between Frank and Moore, and concluding that by the time of
the Moore decision the Court was persuaded that de novo review extended to
mixed questions of law and fact).
32. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 847 (stating that "the Warren
Court greatly liberalized the availability of habeas corpus"); HERTZ &
LIEBMAN, supra note 14, at 74 (claiming that in the mid-1960s, the Court
expanded the scope of habeas corpus so that it was even less deferential than
direct review).
33. After the 1966 amendments, Subsection 2254(d) read, "In any
proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of habeas
corpus ... , a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue,
made by a State court of competent jurisdiction... , shall be presumed to be
correct.. . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1995).

34. Id.
35. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 341 (1980) (holding that section
2254's deferential standard of review does not apply to the state court's
conclusion of law because section 2254 applies only to findings of fact); Hance
v. Zant, 696 F.2d 940, 946 (11th Cir. 1983) (stating that section 2254(d)'s
standard of review does not apply to questions of law or to mixed questions of
law and fact); HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 14, at 45 (explaining that, preAEDPA, federal courts had always reviewed legal questions de novo).

2006]

Why The AEDPA Requires Courts to Exhibit Their Reasoning

1001

C. Congress Urged to Reform
After the broadening of review powers by the Court in the
mid-1960s," the Court became more reluctant to construe habeas
corpus so broadly, resulting in a gradual erosion of federal courts'
ability to grant habeas relief."
In addition to these judicial measures limiting the availability
of habeas corpus, there were calls for legislative reform of habeas
corpus,' calls not entirely unheeded by members of Congress. 9
Indeed, for years there had been criticism that death row inmates
were abusing their right to obtain habeas corpus review in order to
delay their executions. °
36. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976) (holding that
state violation of the exclusionary rule, whereby evidence gathered in violation
of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a criminal trial stemming from
the offense that the evidence would otherwise establish, is not grounds for
habeas corpus because exclusion of evidence is not a constitutional mandate
but a remedy to secure a constitutional guarantee); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288, 310 (1989) (holding that habeas corpus petitioners cannot use new rules
of criminal procedure created after their conviction was made final to
challenge their convictions). See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 847-48
(noting that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have narrowed the availability
of habeas corpus); HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 14, at 16 (observing that the
Rehnquist Court, having rolled back many of the Warren Court's habeas
corpus reforms, indicated in several of its early 1990s decisions that it would
continue to define habeas corpus relief narrowly).
38. See, e.g., ABA, Criminal Justice Section, Report to the House of
Delegates 1 (1989), availableat httpJ/www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads
/sclaid/115e.pdf (recommending reformative measures to Congress to decrease
the amount of time death row inmates spend waiting to be executed by both
limiting the number of habeas petitions available to prisoners and, at the
same time, encouraging states to provide more effective defense counsel);
Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Prisoner Petitions in the
Federal Courts 1980-1996 9 (1997), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov
/bjs/pub/pdflppfc96.pdf (finding that, in 1995, 648 (or 21 percent) of state death
row inmates had a habeas corpus petition active in federal courts); JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
IN CAPITAL CASES, COMMITTEE REPORT AND PROPOSAL 3 (Aug. 23, 1989),

reprinted in Habeas Corpus Revision Act of 1990: Hearingon H.R. 4737 Before
the House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the
Administration of Justice, 101st Cong. 44-52 (1990)[hereinafter Hearings]
(statement of Hon. Lewis J. Powell) (proposing a change in the habeas corpus
law concerning capital cases in conjunction with a program to encourage more
effective assistance of counsel). But see Charlotte Low Allen, Ending Abuse of
Death Penalty Appeals, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1990, at A16 (arguing that the
findings of the Powell-chaired report indicating that habeas corpus petitions
account for the bulk of the delay in executing death row inmates are best
addressed by the Court and not the legislature).
39. H.R. REP. No. 101-681(I), at 114 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6472, 6519 (stating that "[idt is clear that a Congressional response is
warranted"); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 848 (stating that, "[flor many
years," conservatives in Congress had attempted to limit habeas corpus relief).
40. See, e.g., Moore, 261 U.S. at 93 (McReynolds, J., dissenting) ("The
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After resisting reform for years, Congress was finally forced to
act on April 19, 1995. The impetus to reform habeas corpus was
set in motion that day by a car bomb that exploded in the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building in downtown Oklahoma City, killing 168
men, women, and children.4 Of central concern at the time was
that the man convicted for the bombing, Timothy McVeigh, would
file endless frivolous habeas corpus petitions to delay the date of
his execution.42 Because the crime McVeigh committed was so
heinous, there can be little doubt the members of Congress who
signed the act had the families of the victims in mind when they
guaranteed that no such abuse of the writ would take place.'
D. The AEDPA
In 1996, Congress enacted the reforms necessary to ensure
the speedy executions of convicts like McVeigh when it passed the
AEDPA, amending section 2254 of title 28 by adding a new
subsection (d)." The new subsection (d) provides that a state
conviction will not be reversed by a federal court if the disputed
issue was adjudicated on the merits unless the decision was
contrary to federal law, resulted from an unreasonable application
of federal law, or was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts by the state court.4'
Four years after Congress passed the AEDPA, the United
States Supreme Court acknowledged that the act had changed

delays incident to enforcement of our criminal laws have become a national
scandal and give serious alarm to those who observe"); H.R. REP. No. 101681(I), at 112-13 (noting that, according to "knowledgeable observers," death
row inmates file frivolous petitions in order to avoid execution); Allen, supra
note 38, at A16 (criticizing habeas corpus procedure for allowing prisoners to
abuse the petition process in order to delay their executions); Hearings, supra
note 38, at 48 (finding that rules governing abuse of habeas corpus had not
been effective and proposing a change).
41. 142 CONG. REC. S3365-02, S3367 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1996)(statement of
Sen. Nickles).
42. See, e.g., Pres. William J. Clinton, 60 Minutes (CBS television
broadcast, Apr. 23, 1995) quoted in Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Seeks Broad
Powers in Battle Against Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1995, at Al ("If [the
Oklahoma City bombing] is not a crime for which capital punishment is called,
I don't know what is"); 142 CONG. REC. S3368 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Nickles) (urging reform of habeas corpus so that the
Oklahoma City bomber would not be able to use frivolous petitions to delay his
execution).
43. See Press Release, Sen. James Inhofe, Inhofe Hails Passage of Antiterrorism Bill (Apr. 17, 1996) (on file with author) (stating, a day after the
Senate passed the bill, that passage of the bill is a tribute to the families of the
victims and acknowledging the influence the families had on the bill).
44. AEDPA shifted the old 2254(d) to subsection (e) and added a new
paragraph (d). Pub. L. No. 104-132, 112 Stat. 1214.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000).
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"the role of federal habeas courts in reviewing petitions filed by
state prisoners," placing new limitations on their ability to grant
habeas relief.46 According to Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion
in Williams v. Taylor,"7 a state decision of law is not "contrary to"
clearly established federal law unless "the state court arrives at a
conclusion opposite to that reached by [the United States Supreme
Court] on a question of law" or "confronts facts that are materially
indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and
arrives at a result opposite to [the Court's].'
In short, for a state
decision to offend AEDPA review, it must "be substantially
different" from the Court's precedent.49
Regarding the second test in subsection 2254(d), a state
court's application of legal principles to the facts of the case before
it is an "unreasonable application" if the court "identifies the
correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but
unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's
case."5 ' O'Connor refrained from defining "unreasonable" further,
stating simply that it is more stringent than "incorrect.""'
Moreover, O'Connor stressed that the application must be
objectively unreasonable.52 Federal courts are thus restrained
from substituting their subjective interpretations of federal law for
the reasonable interpretation of a state court.53 In short, the
AEDPA drastically increased the amount of deference owed to the
state, from very little deference on a de novo review' to the
current, highly deferential standard.'

46. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 403 (O'Connor, J., Concurring) (disagreeing
with Stevens' construction of AEDPA which would leave habeas corpus
jurisprudence unchanged).
47. 529 U.S. 362.
48. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405 (O'Connor, J., Concurring).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 413.
51. Id. at 410.
52. Id. at 409.
53. See J. Richard Broughton, Habeas Corpus and the Safeguards of
Federalism,2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 109, 123 (2004) (stating that "objective"
means a federal court reviewing a habeas corpus petition may not rely solely
on its own independent judgment that the state court incorrectly applied
federal law).
54. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
55. See Dunn v. Colleran, 247 F.3d 450, 457 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that
after AEDPA federal courts must give state courts' factual and legal
determinations "greater deference than before"); 142 CONG. REC. S3454-01, at
3472 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1996) (statement of Sen. Specter) (asserting that
under AEDPA, federal courts will owe deference to state courts' decisions on
the application of federal law to the facts); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at
849 (noting that AEDPA narrows the scope of habeas corpus relief.)
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The Silent State Opinion

AEDPA deference only applies, however, if the federal claim
was "adjudicated on the merits" in state court.56 If the federal
claim was not adjudicated on the merits, the federal court reviews
the claim de novo, since adjudication
on the merits is necessary to
57
the invocation of subsection 2254(d).
For a number of years after the adoption of the AEDPA,
federal courts relied on the silence of state court opinions as an
indication that the court had not adjudicated the federal claim on
the merits.58
But, after the United States Supreme Court's
59
decision in Early v. Packer,
many courts have interpreted the
Supreme Court's stand on the issue to have been finally
determined. 0 According to Early, a state court decision is not
contrary to6 federal law if the court neglected to cite Supreme
Court cases; indeed, the state court need not even be aware of
Supreme Court cases.6 2
II.

RECENT CIRCUIT COURT CASES ARE DISCORDANT WITH THE
AEDPA AND WITH THE SUPREME COURT

This section addresses the very real problem that encounters
habeas corpus petitioners today, whereby a prisoner in state

56. Gipson, 376 F.3d at 1196; see Sloane, supra note 8, at 618 (stating that
courts need not apply an "unreasonably wrong" standard to state court
determinations of law when the court summarily dismisses a federal claim).
57. Gipson, 376 F.3d at 1196; see Sloane, supra note 8, at 619 (stating that
cursory dismissals of federal claims should be reviewed de novo).
58. See, e.g., Fortini v. Murphy, 257 F.3d 39, 43, 47 (1st Cir. 2001) (noting
that since the state court did not address a constitutional issue in its opinion,
it had not adjudicated that issue on the merits); Smith v. Massey, 235 F.3d
1259, 1264-65 (10th Cir. 2000) ("If a claim was not decided on the merits by
the state courts... this court may exercise its independent judgment in
deciding the claim. In doing so, this court reviews the federal district court's
conclusions of law de novo and its findings of fact, if any, for clear error.");
Weeks v. Angelone, 176 F.3d 249, 258 (4th Cir. 1999) ("When a petitioner has
properly presented a claim to the state court but the state court has not
adjudicated the claim on the merits, however, our review of questions of law
and mixed questions of law and fact is de novo."); Moore v. Parke, 148 F.3d
705, 708 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that because "the state courts did not address
[petitioner's] sufficiency of the evidence argument on the merits ... the new
standard of review in AEDPA does not apply.")
59. 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002).
60. See, e.g., Gipson, 376 F.3d at 1196 (holding that silence of a state court's
opinion on the federal issue does not necessarily mean the state court did not
reach the merits of the issue).
61. Curiously, some courts misread Early as dealing with the "adjudication"
clause. However, it clearly dealt only with the "contrary to" clause. See, e.g.,
Harris v. Ward, No. Civ-02-624-F, 2003 WL 22995021, *16 (W.D. Okla. Nov.
12, 2003) (noting that Early addressed citation of federal cases only in the
context of the "contrary to" clause).
62. Early, 537 U.S. at 8.
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custody is completely denied review of his federal claim by a state
court that has summarily dismissed that claim or, worse, has for
some reason neglected to address it at all.' In order to appreciate
the effect of such situations, one must first understand that the
availability of habeas corpus is related to the standard of review
the federal habeas court will use.'
Under the AEDPA, the state court proceedings must result in
a decision that was either contrary to or based on an unreasonable
application of Supreme Court precedent.'
It is clear from the
plain language of subsection (d), however, that not all state court
adjudications are subject to the strict standards of review in
subsection (d)(1). The threshold inquiry is whether the state court
adjudicated the federal issue on the merits.'
If not, then the
federal issue is not reviewed under the restrictive AEDPA
approach but under the pre-AEDPA, de novo standard of review. 7
In many cases, a court's reasoning is plainly discernible from
the written opinion. Determining whether the state court has
adjudicated a federal claim on the merits becomes difficult,
however, in situations where the state court's written opinion
exhibits none of the court's reasoning regarding a federal issue
properly raised before the court by the inmate petitioner.' In such
63. See, e.g., William P. Welty, Comment, "Adjudication on the Merits"
Under the AEDPA, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 900, 905 (2003) (stating that valid
federal claims are often overlooked or under-analyzed by state courts whose
dismissals are reviewed under strict AEDPA standards).
64. See Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 2001) (observing that
determinations on whether AEDPA deference applies is "all but outcomedeterminative").
65. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000).
66. See Sloane, supra note 8, at 651 (stating that section 2254(d) "requires
the federal habeas court to determine as a threshold matter whether the state
court decision on the federal claim in fact 'resulted' from an 'adjudication on
the merits'"). But see Sellan, 261 F.3d at 308-09 (holding that the level of
deference owed is the last in a series of threshold questions).
67. See Miranda v. Bennett, 322 F.3d 171, 178 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that
where it is impossible to discern the state court's conclusion on a federal issue,
a federal court should not give AEDPA deference to that court's ruling);
Rompilla v. Horn, 355 F.3d 233, 248 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that if an
examination of the state court opinion reveals the court did not decide a
federal claim on the merits, then AEDPA does not apply); Oswald v. Bertrand,
374 F.3d 475, 477 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that if a prisoner's claim was not
adjudicated on the merits, then "the special deference to a state court's
determinations that is prescribed by section 2254(d)(1) goes by the board");
Gipson, 376 F.3d at 1196 (holding that if the state court did not decide a
federal issue on the merits, the section 2254(d)(1) deference requirements do
not apply and the court will address the issue de novo); White v. Coplan, 296
F. Supp. 2d 46, 47 (D.N.H. 2003) (reviewing the constitutional claim de novo
because there was no state court adjudication to which the federal habeas
court could defer).
68. See, e.g., Gipson, 376 F.3d at 1196 (holding that the state court had
adjudicated a properly raised double jeopardy claim even though the court had
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cases, most federal courts use a test or rather a presumption to
determine whether a state court has addressed a federal claim.69
The courts commonly impute hypothetical reasoning to the state
courts in the absence of any reasoning in the written opinion,
based solely upon the conclusion reached by the state court.7 ° It is
not a far leap, then, to conclude that the state court has
"adjudicated" the claim on the merits. Thus, the federal habeas
court almost invariably uses the AEDPA's heightened standard of
review even when there has arguably been no adjudication on the
merits, which, as the court in Sellan v. Kuhlman71 stated, is
tantamount to a denial of relief.7"
A.

The Effect of Early v. Packer on the Meaning of "Adjudicated
on the Merits"

In 2002, the Supreme Court supposedly dealt a fatal blow to
habeas corpus. In a per curiam opinion, the Court in Early held
that a state court's failure to be aware of - let alone cite Supreme Court precedent will not, alone, bring the decision
outside the deferential AEDPA review.73
To some courts, Early vindicated their position that
unreasoned opinions equaled adjudications.74 It appears to many
that Early reinforced the results-oriented approach that is
suggested by the common usage of the phrase "adjudicated on the
merits."75 Under the results-oriented approach, the federal habeas
not set forth its reasoning when dismissing that claim and had issued only a
one-sentence dismissal without mentioning double jeopardy); Gipson, 376 F.3d
at 1201 (Cassel, J., dissenting) (arguing that mentioning the other claims,
based on state law, and excluding the federal claim was evidence the state
court did not adjudicate the federal claim on the merits).
69. See Sloane, supra note 8, at 652-53 (finding that most federal circuits
have adopted an analytical method whereby the court discerns from the face of
the state court opinion whether the state court more likely than not
adjudicated the federal claim on the merits).
70. See id.at 655-56 (suggesting that, in the absence of a discussion on the
federal claim in state court opinions, some federal courts apply a legal fiction
by imputing a hypothetical analytical process to the state court in order to
examine the result under AEDPA).
71. Sellan, 261 F.3d at 303.
72. Id. at 310.
73. 537 U.S. at 8.
74. See Gipson, 376 F.3d at 1196, n.1 (concluding that the state court's
discussion of the prisoner's state law, prosecutorial misconduct claims that
arose from the same facts as his federal double jeopardy claim indicated an
adjudication on the merits because Early does not require citation to Supreme
Court cases).
75. See Sellan, 261 F.3d at 311 (endorsing the commonly understood
meaning of the phrase "adjudicated on the merits" as "a decision finally
resolving the parties' claims, with res judicata effect, that is based on the
substance of the claim advanced, rather than on a procedural, or other,
ground").
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court considers the petitioner's claim as presented to the state
appellate court and then considers whether the dismissal of that
claim was either an unreasonable application of or contrary to
clearly established federal law."6
But those who thought Early heralded the arrival of
unquestioned adjudication need only read the subordinate clause
modifying the "citation" and "awareness" admonishment: "so long
as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision
contradicts them."" Early requires that federal habeas courts
consider the reasoning behind state courts' dismissals of federal
claims, as well as the results. Thus, the belief that state courts
may abdicate their duty to provide the reasoning behind
dismissals of federal issues is not only unsupported, but is, indeed,
contradicted by the Court in Early.8
Likewise, a review of the decision in Early, which reversed
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, demonstrates that the Court
did not excuse federal habeas courts from considering state courts'
reasoning when determining whether the federal claim has been
adjudicated on the merits. The Ninth Circuit began its AEDPA
review of the petitioner's claim by observing that a state court's
decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if it failed to
9
Thus, since the
apply the controlling Supreme Court authority."
California Appellate Court "failed to cite to any federal law, much
less the controlling Supreme Court precedents," the Ninth Circuit
held the decision to be contrary to federal law, as viewed under
AEDPA.w
The United States Supreme Court, limited to the issue of
whether failure to cite Supreme Court cases renders the state
76. It is irrelevant, in scenarios such as these, whether the state court
summarily dismissed the federal claim or did not address it whatsoever in the
written opinion. If the federal issue was raised and the state court either

ignored it or deemed it too frivolous to address, there is no other conclusion
than finding that it was dismissed.
77. Early, 537 U.S. at 8 (emphasis added).
78. See, e.g., Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding

that federal courts need only review the outcome of the state court's
adjudication, however deficient the discussion of the reasons for reaching that
outcome are); Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding

that the court owes deference to only the state court's result even if its
reasoning is not apparent from the written opinion); Sellan, 261 F.3d at 311
("Nothing in the phrase 'adjudicated on the merits' requires the state court to
have explained its reasoning process. Nowhere does the statute make
reference to the state court's process of reasoning.")

79. Packer v. Hill, 291 F.3d 569, 578 (9th Cir. 2002). It is significant to
note that the Packer court bypassed the threshold inquiry whereby the court
determines whether the federal claim was adjudicated and holding that
habeas relief is available "only if" the rulings violated the subsection (d)(1)

standards. Id. at 577. The court seems to suggest that AEDPA deference
applies regardless of whether it was adjudicated.

80. Id. at 578.
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court's decision "contrary" to federal law, reversed the Ninth
Circuit.8' The Court held that, when determining whether a state
court adjudication is contrary to federal law, the proper factors for
federal courts to consider are the results and the reasoning of the
state court, not citation to Supreme Court precedent.82
Early stops at forgiving state courts for their failure to cite
Supreme Court cases and does not proceed further. Early does not
compel state courts to include a discussion of the reasons that led
them to dismiss federal claims. Early also does not instruct
federal habeas courts what to examine in the absence of any
reasoning in the state court's opinion. However, it is consistent
with the holding of Early that habeas courts should not proceed
under the AEDPA without some manifestation of the court's
reasoning. In fact, Early encourages state courts of appeals to
expressly provide the reasoning behind their dismissals of
constitutional claims.
B. CurrentApproaches to the Threshold Question
1.

The Presumptionof Adjudication

Whereas the Supreme Court encourages federal courts to
consider the reasoning behind state court dismissals of federal
claims, most circuits have held that a federal court need only
consider the result of the state court decision and not the
reasoning, even after Early.' The Second,' Third,85 Fourth,"
Fifth,87 Seventh,'
Eighth,89 Ninth," Tenth,' and Eleventh 2
81. Early, 537 U.S. at 8, 11.
82. Id. at 8.
83. See infra notes 84-92.
84. See, e.g., Sellan, 261 F.3d at 311 (adopting the Fifth Circuit's analysis
for determining whether a federal claim has been adjudicated on the merits in
state court)
85. See Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597, 606 (3d Cir. 2002) (relying on
Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (2000), to reject the view that summary
dismissals warrant de novo review). The Third Circuit's reliance on Weeks
was misguided however. See Sloane, supra note 8, at 640 n.126 (indicating
that the Weeks decision did not compel a broad construction of adjudication).
The Court in Weeks never reached the issue of whether the state court had
adjudicated the federal issue on the merits; instead, the Court independently
found no constitutional violation. Weeks, 528 U.S. at 236.
86. See Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 163 (4th Cir. 2000) (endorsing a
results-oriented approach); see also Cardwell v. Greene, 152 F.3d 331, 339 (4th
Cir. 1998) (defining "adjudication," by relying on Black's Law Dictionary, as
coming to a final determination).
87. See Mercadel v. Cain, 179 F.3d 271, 274 (5th Cir. 1999) (articulating a
three-part analysis to determine whether a federal claim has been adjudicated
on the merits); see also Sloane, supra note 8, at 653 (criticizing the
Mercadel/Sellananalysis as unlikely to produce an accurate result).
88. See Hennon, 109 F.3d at 334-35 (adopting a results-oriented analysis by
finding that, since the AEDPA changed the relationship between state and
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Circuits have adopted approaches that allow federal habeas courts
to find an adjudication was made on the merits where the decision
itself manifests little or no apparent reasoning.93 Presumably, this
rule applies regardless of whether the state courts include a
discussion of the criminal procedure claim. In short, such an
adjudication becomes equivalent to a final judgment with res
judicata effect.'
Additionally, at least one circuit, the Tenth, has held that the
petitioner bears the burden of showing that the federal issue was
not adjudicated on the merits.95 Although there is disagreement as
to the quantum of evidence the petitioner must provide, the
burden is, nevertheless, a difficult one to meet.9
These strict, results-oriented circuits presume that a state
court, though silent, has satisfactorily addressed the disputed
criminal procedure violation. Presumably, since federal courts
review the results and not the reasoning of the state courts, they
will apply AEDPA review to all dismissals of federal claims unless
the state court explicitly states that it did not adjudicate that
federal courts, state courts need not "articulate a rational path connecting the
law and the evidence to the outcome").
89. See James v. Bowersox, 187 F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that
"the summary nature of the [state court's] opinion does not affect this
standard of review"); accord Brown v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 458, 462 (8th Cir.
2004) (citing James v. Bowersox, 187 F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 1999).
90. See Delgado v. Lewis, 181 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying
AEDPA analysis to decisions for which the state court did not provide a basis).
91. See Aycox, 196 F.3d at 1177-78 (holding that petitioners have the
burden of production, whereby they must bring forward evidence that the
state court did not consider the federal claim, and that federal habeas courts
owe deference to the state court's result notwithstanding absence of expressly
stated reasoning); Gipson, 376 F.3d at 1196 (applying Aycox and requiring the
petitioner to produce evidence of the state court's failure to address the federal
aspects of the petitioner's appeal when the state court failed to even mention
that claim). The burden of production imposed in Aycox makes it possible that
a state court opinion that fails to mention the prisoner's constitutional claim
would nevertheless receive AEDPA deference absent the production of any
evidence of the state court's failure to address the issue. This burden brings
the Tenth Circuit more in line with the Fourth and Seventh Circuits than with
the Second and Fifth Circuits.
92. See Wright v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir.
2002) (holding that an unexplained rejection of a federal issue qualifies as
adjudication and is entitled to AEDPA deference).
93. See Sloane, supra note 8, at 619 n.26 (collecting cases).
94. See, e.g., Sellan, 261 F.3d at 311 (holding that an adjudication on the
merits is equivalent to a final decision with res judicata effect).
95. See Gipson, 376 F.3d at 1196 (holding that there must be some
indication to suggest that the state court did not reach the merits of the
federal claim when there is no mention of that claim in that opinion).
96. Gipson, 376 F.3d at 1200 (Cassell, J., dissenting) (finding sufficient
indicia that the state court did not reach the merits of a claim since the state
court opinion addressed state law claims that arose from the same occurrences
as the federal claim but failed to mention the federal claim).
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claim on the merits. This violates the plain language of the
AEDPA, which asserts that only claims actually adjudicated on
the merits are to be reviewed under subsection (d)(1).
2.

The Mercadel/Sellan Test
Unlike the other circuits adopting the broad construction of
"adjudication," the Mercadel/Sellan test, adopted by the Second
and Fifth Circuits, is an analytical approach rather than a
presumption.97 The relevant factors are:
(1) what the state courts have done in similar cases; (2) whether the
history of the case suggests that the state court was aware of any
ground for not adjudicating the case on the merits; and (3) whether
the state courts' opinions suggest reliance upon procedural grounds
rather than a determination on the merits.98
A federal court may use this analysis to determine whether a
state court has more likely than not actually addressed the
disputed issue instead of simply presuming it did.'
This
approach, however, does not mend the constitutional flaws
inherent in the presumptive approach used by other circuits.
The constitutional problem is two-fold. First, what state
courts have done in similar cases does not illuminate a later
court's or panel's reasoning. °° Without a basis for believing that
the state court dismissed a federal claim on its substance, state
courts can insulate themselves from federal court scrutiny by
silently dismissing the claim. If the state court is assured that its
decision will receive AEDPA deference regardless of the court's
actual consideration of the issue, then it has no incentive to reach
the issue.
Second, since the Mercadel approach uses precious judicial
resources on only a threshold issue, federal courts seldom employ
it.'0 '
Instead of evaluating the federal claim under AEDPA
deference, federal courts wishing to avoid using the Mercadel

97. The Sellan court found that "adjudicated on the merits" means that the
state appellate court had reached a decision on the substance of the claim
rather than on a procedural or other ground. 261 F.3d at 311. Therefore, the
three-part analysis is meant to determine whether the decision was reached
based on the substance of the claim.
98. Mercadel, 179 F.3d at 274.
99. See Sloane, supra note 8, at 655-56 (indicating that the Mercadel test,
among others, imputes hypothetical reasoning to the state court to determine

whether it is likely that the court adjudicated the claim on the merits).

100. See id. at 653-54 (questioning whether the Mercadel/Sellan approach
can reliably indicate that a state court's boilerplate dismissal was not an
adjudication on the merits).

101. Id. at 654.
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analysis can dismiss the claim de novo and state that the result
would have been the same under AEDPA deference.'
3.

The FirstCircuit and CalabresiApproaches

The First Circuit Court of Appeals is the only court to adopt a
narrow construction of the phrase "adjudicated on the merits."'8
Hence, in Dibenedetto v. Hall, the First Circuit found that a
federal claim warrants discussion if its dismissal is going to be
reviewed under the AEDPA."' The circuit has since reaffirmed
this view in the wake of Early. °6
In a concurring opinion in Washington v. Schriver, °7 Judge
Calabresi of the Second Circuit proposed a similar approach,
whereby the AEDPA would not apply unless the state court had
expressly mentioned the claim's federal aspects. 8
Calabresi
reasoned that state courts will thereby be given a linguistic device
to control judicial resources. 9
If the court wants AEDPA
deference, it need only refer to the law governing a petitioner's
federal claims."0 On the other hand, if the state court wants to
avoid addressing federal claims, it can do so by remaining silent on
the federal claim, thereby signaling to federal courts that the
AEDPA does not apply."' According to Judge Calabresi, this
approach is in line with notions of state sovereignty because it
gives state courts more control of their dockets than do tests or
presumptions."
This rule poses problems of its own, however. Consider a
state court that neglects to refer to the federal aspects of a
properly raised claim in its written opinion, yet satisfactorily

102. See id. (suggesting that courts seldom analyze the issue of adjudication
and, instead, claim that the outcome would be the same whether given
deference or reviewed de novo). For further criticism of the Mercadel analysis,
see id. at 654-57 (adding that notions of comity are not implicated when a
federal claim has merit but the state court neglected to address it).
103. Id. at 619.
104. 272 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001).
105. Id. at 7.
106. Norton v. Spencer, 351 F.3d 1, 5 n.1 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding that Early
does not preclude de novo review of unarticulated state court dismissals).
107. 255 F.3d 45, 61-65 (2d Cir. 2001) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
108. Id. at 61-62.
109. Id. at 63.
110. Id. Because Washington was decided before the Supreme Court decided
Early the suggestion that state courts should mention federal law is too
narrow in light of the Supreme Court's express pardon for failing to be aware
of Supreme Court precedent. But since the Supreme Court urges federal
habeas courts to consider the state court's discussion of the federal claim - in

addition to its result - it would likely be permissible to require state courts to
refer to the underlying doctrine compelling the dismissal of a federal claim.
111. Washington, 255 F.3d at 63.

112. Id.
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addresses the claim. Whereas federal courts currently allow the
party opposing a petition for habeas corpus to rebut the finding of
non-adjudication, under the Calabresi rule, non-adjudication
would be an irrebuttable presumption where the opinion is
silent."'
III.

CHANGING THE STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING ADJUDICATION

This comment first suggests that the results-oriented
approach is inconsistent with the AEDPA and with Early. Thus,
the federal habeas courts should look to the reasoning behind the
state court adjudication, with the burden falling on state courts to
show that their dismissals of constitutional claims are not
arbitrary or capricious."'
Second, this comment proposes
standards of adjudication that may be adopted by courts.
A. Expressed Reasoning as Condition Precedent

The requirement to examine the reasoning of a state court
decision is the soundest way to guarantee the viability of habeas
corpus as a meaningful protector of individual rights. The view
that federal courts must review both the reasons for as well as the
results of a state court's decision has been rejected in the habeas
context by a number of jurists."' Notably, Judges Easterbrook and
Posner, both of the Seventh Circuit, have rejected this view by
analogizing habeas review to review of administrative decisions." 6
When federal courts review administrative decisions, they consider
not only the outcome, but the rationale behind the outcome as
well." 7' Judges Easterbrook and Posner argue that imposing this
requirement on state courts is inappropriate because of the
changes in the relationship between state and federal courts

113. A different panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals later addressed
Calabresi's approach and rejected it. Sellan, 261 F.3d at 313-4.
114. Under this scheme, there is no penalty imposed on a state court for
abdicating its responsibility to supply reasoning. There is an incentive to
rationalize a court's decision, however: the heightened AEDPA standard of
review.
115. E.g., Hennon, 109 F.3d at 335 (rejecting an approach whereby state
courts are forced to articulate "a rational path connecting the law and the
evidence to the outcome"); Cole v. Young, 817 F.2d 412, 433 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (noting, in a pre-AEDPA habeas case, that the
doctrine whereby administrative agencies must explain why they did not
follow their precedents has never been applied to courts).
116. See supra note 115.
117. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371
U.S. 156, 168 (1962)) (holding that administrative agencies must offer an
explanation for their "actions including a 'rational connection between the

facts found and the choice made'").
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brought on by passage of AEDPA and because of larger issues of
federalism. " 8
These concerns are misplaced, however. First, it is clear from
the language of the AEDPA that the federalism argument does not
fit in the habeas context. 9 As stated above, habeas corpus review
applies constitutional criminal procedure protections developed by
the United States Supreme Courts to state courts. Although it is
both proper and necessary for states to develop their own criminal
procedure protections, state courts may not provide any less
protection than that afforded by the United States Constitution, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court. Therefore, it is unsurprising
that the AEDPA only makes violations of "established Supreme
Court precedent" reversible upon habeas corpus review. Because
federal habeas courts review only the federal constitutional
aspects of a claim, state courts cannot embellish on "established
12
Supreme Court precedent." Thus, any "subtle changes,,
to that
precedent will add nothing to the interpretation of the law.
It is also wrong to assume that because the AEDPA changed
the "tutelary relation[ship]"12' between state and federal courts,
state courts are not bound to announce the reasons behind their
decisions.
Granted, the drafters of the AEDPA had state
sovereignty in mind when they developed the strict standards of
review of state court decisions, 22 but allowing state courts to make
decisions without providing rational reasons for them does not
further those goals.
1.

Support in Early

Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue,
dictum in Early indicates that the Court would not limit its

118. In a pre-AEDPA case, Judge Easterbrook found the administrative
agency analogy unfitting because, unlike administrative agencies, courts
develop the law by making subtle changes, "many unarticulated or even
denied." Cole, 817 F.2d at 433 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). In a case decided
after the AEDPA was passed but before Williams was decided, then Chief
Judge Posner, writing for the court, rejected requiring state courts to
articulate their reasoning before being deferred to because the AEDPA sought
to end federal court supervision of state courts. Hennon, 109 F.3d at 335.
119. See Sloane, supra note 8, at 656-57 (noting that federal habeas courts
further none of the purposes of federalism or comity by deferring to silent
state court opinions). Sloane then notes that federal courts show more respect
to state courts by examining a claim the state court did not adjudicate than by
imputing hypothetical analysis to the state court. Id. at 657.
120. Cole, 817 F.2d at 433 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
121. Hennon, 109 F.3d at 335.
122. See 142 CONG. REC. S3706-01, S3706 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Gorton) (noting with disapproval that one federal district
court judge can find the entire appellate system of a state in violation of the

Constitution).
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definition of adjudication to the results of a state court's opinion. 123
In Early, the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's emphasis
on citation to Supreme Court precedent as a factor in determining
whether a state court decision was contrary to federal law. The
Court held that even ignorance of Supreme Court precedent would
not indicate that the state court's adjudication was contrary to
federal law. 124 The Court held that the aspects of the state court's
adjudication pertinent to determining whether its decision is
discordant with federal law are the results and the reasoning of
the decision, not citation to Supreme Court cases."' Although the
Court's endorsement of reasoning as a relevant factor arises in the
context of a "contrary to" inquiry, it suggests that the Court's
concept of "adjudicated" includes, as a necessary component, an
apparent rational and reasoned basis underpinning the result.
Assuming the threshold issue must be satisfied before section
2254(d) operates,2 6 it is axiomatic that if the reasoning behind a
court's decision is relevant to the operative clauses of section
2254(d) (i.e., the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application"
clauses), it must be relevant to the threshold issue as well (i.e.,
"adjudication"). 2 7

123. Although the Supreme Court has never made explication of reasoning a
condition of review, the Court has always encouraged state courts to reason
thoroughly:
As long ago as 1953, the Court stressed the importance of a state court
'opinion specifically setting forth its reasons that there has been no
denial of due process of law.' And the Court's post-1996 cases, though
not requiring a state court to cite federal precedent, have praised those
state courts that have thoroughly analyzed federal law. Although the
approach proposed here would impose a new formal requirement to cite
and thoroughly analyze federal authority, it does not impose an
obligation the value of which should come as a surprise to state courts.
Steven Semeraro, Criminal Law: A Reasoning-Process Review Model for
Federal Habeas Corpus, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 897, 937 (2004)
(footnotes omitted).
124. Early, 537 U.S. at 8.
125. Id.
126. The threshold issue, of course, is whether the claim was adjudicated on
the merits. Some courts even refer to the "adjudication" requirement as a
condition precedent. E.g., Brown v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 458, 460 (8th Cir.
2004) (stating that adjudication is the condition precedent to application of the
deferential AEDPA standard to a petitioner's claim); see also Cotto v. Herbert,
331 F.3d 217, 229-30 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[Tlhe standard governing federal habeas
review depends on whether petitioner's claim has been previously 'adjudicated
on the merits' by a state court.").
127. The Supreme Court's admonishment to examine the rational
underpinnings of state court decisions when reasoning is apparent does not
suggest that the Court would find that the absence of apparent reasoning
precludes the operation of section 2254(d). However, the Court has never
considered the effect of the absence of reasoning on the operation of section
2254(d). Moreover, whatever the Court's hostility to placing any requirements
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2. To not require explicit reasoningwould renderAEDPA
meaningless and give states too much freedom
Allowing federal habeas courts to analyze state court
decisions under AEDPA regardless of the presence of reasoning in
the decision would render the adjudication on the merits clause
meaningless.
The adjudication requirement was meant to
guarantee that habeas courts defer to only thoughtfully rendered
decisions. If all decisions, careless or otherwise, were subject to
the AEDPA's outcome-determinative standard of review, the
adjudication clause would be meaningless. Since the United
States Supreme Court prefers to give meaning to every clause of a
statute, 8 ignoring the adjudication clause is almost certainly
improper."
It would be shocking to suggest that a state court might rest
its decision on the outcome of a coin toss. But under current
interpretation in a majority of the federal circuits, a decision so
decided would still receive deference under the standards set forth
in AEDPA, assuming, of course, the court did not announce its
capricious methods. 3 ' Since nothing stops state courts from acting
arbitrarily, yet silently, the requirement that the claim be
adjudicated on the merits before its dismissal is granted AEDPA
deference is rendered meaningless.'

on state courts, according to the plain meaning of AEDPA section 2245(d) does
not operate unless there was an adjudication.
128. United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-9 (1955) (quoting
Township of Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. (17 Otto) 147, 152 (1883)) ("It is
our duty 'to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.'").
129. Some courts continue to defer to summary dispositions, however, by
determining that a proper adjudication is unconnected to underlying
reasoning. E.g., Sellan, 261 F.3d at 311-12. According to these courts,
adjudication is rather "a decision finally resolving the parties' claims, with res
judicata effect." Id. at 311; accord Bell, 236 F.3d at 157-58. Simply finding
that summary dismissals are no less adjudications than reasoned decisions
does not cure the statutory defect. Because there is no way to distinguish
unreasoned opinions from unadjudicated opinions, it is likely that even
unadjudicated dismissals will be deferred to under AEDPA, which directly
conflicts with the adjudication requirement.
130. One assumes that even courts that interpret "adjudication" broadly
would balk at giving the statement, "We flipped a coin," AEDPA-deference.
131. Whereas the opinions of other Circuits seem to acknowledge that there
are some situations in which the AEDPA would not apply, in Hennon, Judge
Posner seems to argue that all dispositions are adjudications and are thus
subject to AEDPA deference. Hennon, 109 F.3d at 335. However, in Oswald,
Judge Posner acknowledges that there are situations for which the AEDPA
does not apply, for example, when the state court has not reached the merits of
a constitutional error. 374 F.3d at 477. How, then, would courts distinguish
unadjudicated claims from adjudicated claims? The answer seems to be that
there is no distinction.
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B. Defining "Reasoning"
1.

Plain Meaning
According to Merriam Webster's Dictionary, "reasoning" is
defined as the use of reason. The noun "reason" derives from the
Latin verb "reri," which means "to think" or "to calculate." Of
course, any action a person makes requires thought in the strictest
sense.
But reason in the legal context means finding an
explanation for a course of conduct or thought. It connotes a
struggle between alternatives.'32 If state courts are going to make
their decisions meaningful, they should announce the reasons for
their holdings.
2. Analogy to AdministrativeAgencies
In the interest of clarity, federal courts have urged
administrative courts to express their reasoning."
Although
analogies have been made between habeas review and
administrative review, the suggestion that state courts should be
held to that standard has specifically been rejected.'
However,
the benefits of requiring exhibited reasoning as a prerequisite for
AEDPA review far outweigh the burden.
In the administrative review context, the Seventh Circuit has
stated that the reviewing court will not be able to assess the
reasonableness of the agency's choice if the agency does not make
a rational connection between the facts and the choice."' The
rational connection test is a prerequisite to review by the federal
court.
Habeas courts are similarly charged to assess the
reasonableness (or consonance with federal law) of state court
determinations.
One can then conclude that it is no less
impossible to assess the reasonableness of a state court's decision
when it does not exhibit the reasons behind its choices. 36 Thus, in
132. In the criminal procedure context, the alternatives are "the defendant's
rights have been violated and the error was not harmless" and "the
defendant's rights have not been violated or have been violated, but
harmlessly".
133. E.g., Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. E.P.A., 25 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 1994)
(stating that the administrative body must exhibit the reasons for its choices,
otherwise the reviewing court cannot assess the reasonableness of those
choices).
134. See supra note 118. It is interesting to note that while most courts look
at the reasoning to inform the "adjudication" issue, in Hennon Chief Judge
Posner considered the reasoning more useful for the "unreasonable
application" issue. 109 F.3d at 334-5. Judge Posner may have adopted this
notion from his administrative agency opinions in which he argued that
agencies must exhibit the reasons for their choices in order for the reviewing
court to assess the reasonableness of the choice. Madison Gas, 25 F.3d at 529.
135. Madison Gas, 25 F.3d at 529.
136. Neither is the rational connection test overly burdensome-it is,
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all cases, federal habeas courts should only defer to a state court's
determination when there is a rational connection
between the
7
facts of the petitioner's claim and its dismissal.1
Even if a state court determines that the constitutional claim
is frivolous, the state court should still manifest that it has applied
the rule to the facts and has held that the rule does not proscribe
the conduct described by the facts.'38
IV. CONCLUSION

Congress doubtlessly intended the AEDPA to limit the
availability of the great writ. 9
However, the AEDPA did not
change the role of federal courts upon habeas review--overseeing
state courts that apply constitutional criminal procedure.""° State
courts must still protect constitutional guarantees. Indeed, the
AEDPA gave state courts more responsibility to do so insofar as
federal courts can only strike down egregious constitutional
errors."4
However, the trend in the circuits toward a broad
interpretation of "adjudication," although possibly in line with the
according to Judge Posner, an "undemanding standard." Id.
137. At a minimum, the recitation of facts alone should not be enough to
exhibit a rational connection. Similarly, the enunciation of a rule should not
be interpreted on review as an indication that the court has made a
determination based on a reasoning process. A reasoning process involves
some application of facts (though unsupported by the manifest weight of the
evidence) to a rule (though wrongly determined). This is the only way in
which federal courts will be certain to determine whether the adjudication was
either unreasonable in light of the facts of the case or contrary to established
Supreme Court precedent.
138. For example, consider a case in which the habeas petitioner had
objected to the inclusion of his confession at trial on Fifth Amendment
grounds. The prisoner claims that his confession was obtained without the
interrogating officer having warned the prisoner of his right to remain silent.
The most significant evidence at trial was a videotaped confession in which
the prisoner was asked several times whether he wanted an attorney and in
which he was told that his statements would be used against him in court.
Concluding that his trial objection and appealable grounds were without basis
the appellate court summarily dismisses the constitutional claim along with
49 other claims, all based on state law, all equally frivolous. All the court need
do is express its opinion that the prisoner was not deprived of his Fifth
Amendment rights because he had been warned explicitly. This would satisfy
the rational connection test.
139. Section 2254(d) echoes some of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts' most
fatal blows to Warren-era expansions. See generally Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 494-95 (1976) (exempting violations of the exclusionary rule from habeas
protection).
140. Contra Hennon, 109 F.3d at 335 ("It would place the federal court in
just the kind of tutelary relation to the state courts that the [AEDPA is]
designed to end.")
141. Such errors are defined by AEDPA as decisions that are unreasonable
applications of clearly established federal law or decisions that are contrary to
clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) (2000).
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wishes of Congress, 142 has led to confusion at best, and abdication
at worst, by federal courts hearing habeas corpus petitions under a
presumption that any disposition amounts to an adjudication,
since under such a presumption all summary dismissals are
subject to the fatal AEDPA standards.
Now, state courts have little incentive to examine the merits
of defendants' claims of constitutional violations. In the long run,
this delegitimizes state courts' role as protectors of constitutional
rights. Ironically, lawmakers supporting AEDPA claimed that the
AEDPA would reclaim some of the state courts' importance."

142. For instance, during the floor debates on AEDPA, Senator Arlen
Specter expressed his fear that too rigid an adjudication requirement has led
to "excessive formalism and delay." 142 CONG. REC. S3454-01, S3471 (1996)
(daily ed. Apr. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen. Spector).
143. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.

